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Abstract
On NATO’s fiftieth anniversary, we were faced with an unexpected choice: we had to decide
whether the notion of common values is only rhetorical flourish or whether it carries real meaning.
We made our choice. We decided that values do not only have to be preached, but also upheld.
The essay will recount the events leading up to the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and outline
the reasons for NATO’s decision to take action. Next it will evaluate NATO’s success in light of its
humanitarian and military goals. Finally it will examine the challenges facing Kosovo and NATO
in the future.
NATO'S ACTIONS TO UPHOLD HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN
KOSOVO: A TEST CASE FOR A
NEW ALLIANCE
Sergio Balanzino*
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's ("NATO") fiftieth
anniversary last year was to be mainly a celebration. At our ma-
jor summit meeting in Washington last April, our heads of state
and government were expected to gather, confirm our mutual
security commitments, celebrate NATO successes, and make
speeches on our community of values.
The events in Kosovo changed our focus. Suddenly, we
were faced with an unexpected choice: we had to decide
whether the notion of common values is only rhetorical flourish
or whether it carries real meaning. We made our choice. We
decided that values do not only have to be preached, but also
upheld. This decision is why the Allies supported the effort to
achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Kosovo. Indeed,
the Rambouillet' talks were largely the result of the patient and
persistent diplomacy of Allied nations. Our decision to uphold
values also explains why the Alliance opted to use military force
against the Yugoslav security forces and the government in Bel-
grade once these negotiations had failed.
We did not enter lightly into the decision to use force. The
humanitarian tragedy was not likely to stop within a few days.
The military risks to our soldiers would be significant. Civilian
casualties might occur. Our important relationship with Russia
was likely to suffer. And, last but not least, some people would
charge NATO with taking international law into its own hands.
Despite these potential risks and drawbacks, NATO decided
to go ahead. It did so for three reasons. First and foremost, we
acted to stop the humanitarian tragedy. To stand idly by while a
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brutal campaign of forced deportation, torture, and murder
took place in the heart of Europe would have opened us to accu-
sations that we proclaimed values that we were not prepared to
defend. Imagine the justified public outcry if NATO decided to
look the other way. The talk of turning Europe into a common
political, economic, and security space would have been revealed
as empty rhetoric if we had tolerated the barbaric practice of
ethnic cleansing on our doorstep. One of the lessons of Bosnia
was that acting earlier might have been less costly in the end.
We learned this lesson and resolved that we would not repeat
that mistake.
Second, all other political and economic means had been
exhausted before we reverted to military action. President
Slobodan Milosevic's refusal to sign the Rambouillet Accords
made it clear that he had no interest in a political solution. He
tried instead to create a new ethnic reality on that ground. Any
balanced and impartial observer realizes that military force was
the only option left to stop him, and, hopefully, make him re-
consider his actions. The Allies had no choice but to stand firm,
leaving Milosevic without any alternative but to accept robust se-
curity arrangements to ensure the return of the Kosovar refu-
gees.
Finally, we acted to prevent a further destabilization in the
Balkans. As the U.N. Security Council already confirmed in two
important resolutions before NATO used force, the destabiliza-
tion caused by the onslaught of Milosevic's brutal security forces
constituted a threat to the entire region. In this respect, no one
should forget that the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo began many
months before NATO launched its first strike. It was to stop
Milosevic from writing the final chapter in his campaign to sys-
tematically depopulate Kosovo that NATO decided it could no
longer postpone military action. Milosevic's initiation of geno-
cide would not be the first regional crisis in the Balkans that
turned into something far bigger and nastier. With several hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees being driven into neighboring
countries by Milosevic's brutal actions, the entire region faced a
serious threat of general collapse. Those neighboring countries,
which themselves faced serious political and economic
problems, had long reached the limits of their ability to cope
with this exceptional burden. In short, if it had not been ener-
getically opposed, then Belgrade's policy of deliberate displace-
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ment of the Kosovo-Albanians would have resulted in even more
instability and bloodshed.
NATO pursued military actions until President Milosevic
conceded to the demands of the international community:
• a verifiable cessation to all military action and the imme-
diate end to the killing;
" the withdrawal of Serb military, police, and paramilitary
forces;
" the deployment in Kosovo of an international military
presence;
* the return of all refugees;
* the establishment of a political framework for Kosovo on
the basis of the Rambouillet Accords.
I believe that NATO's actions in Kosovo met many of the tradi-
tional conditions of the 'Just War:" military action came after all
peaceful means of modulating the crisis had been exhausted;
the military means used were strictly proportionate to the objec-
tives pursued; every effort was made to minimize civilian casual-
ties by targeting military objectives; and, finally, the good that
the conflict achieved outweighed the inevitable price that had to
be paid based on the number of Kosovar refugees who have re-
turned to their homes today. In short, the conflict opened the
way to a political solution in Kosovo and provided an immediate
solution to alleviate human suffering. These goals had been elu-
sive before the use of force. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,
the countries of the European Union, and NATO all agreed:
Without taking all of these steps there could be no peaceful
multi-ethnic democratic Kosovo in which all of its people live in
security.
Clearly, NATO's Kosovo operation was a major challenge in
the history of the Atlantic Alliance. For the first time, a defen-
sive alliance launched a military campaign in order to avoid a
humanitarian tragedy outside its own borders. For the first time,
an alliance of sovereign nations did not fight in order to pre-
serve its territorial integrity, or to conquer territory, but to pro-
tect the values on which it was founded. And, despite many diffi-
culties, it prevailed.
NATO's actions in Kosovo have sparked a debate about the
relationship between values and interests, and between humani-
tarian needs and state sovereignty. It is a debate that will remain
with us for a long time to come. Interventions, such as those
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carried out by the Alliance in Kosovo, raise difficult questions.
What is the appropriate legal basis to use force, especially if a
U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force
cannot be obtained? At which stage do dictators abusing the
rights of their citizens forfeit their right to have their country's
sovereignty respected? What type of atrocity or systematic abuse
of human rights should trigger a military intervention? In the
current environment, it is not easy to give clear and consistent
answers to these questions. But the international community is
now confronting these issues head on as we have seen at this
year's U.N. General Assembly. The international community will
no doubt also continue to operate on a case-by-case basis. None-
theless, it is now clear that the protection of the rights of people,
and not the rights of states, is becoming in the 1990s the new
guiding principle of international relations. NATO cannot and
has not ignored this important evolution. It has become an in-
trinsic part of the Alliance's transformation since the end of the
Cold War ten years ago.
Throughout the 1990s, NATO has been transforming itself
to serve the security needs of all the peoples of Europe, not only
its own citizens. With the accession of the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland to the Alliance in March 1999, NATO ended
Europe's Cold War division for good. With its policies of part-
nership and outreach, NATO created a security framework that
engages two dozen non-NATO nations in permanent political
consultation and military cooperation. The two main mecha-
nisms of this framework are the Partnership for Peace and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. By helping to bring the
armed forces of our Partner countries under democratic control
and fostering a cooperative approach to security among them,
NATO is helping to reduce the potential for armed conflict in
Europe-and thereby enhancing human rights and individual
freedoms. Democracy can prosper only in conditions of secur-
ity. NATO through its partnerships is helping to provide that
security. And with an institutionalized NATO-Russia relation-
ship, we acknowledge the relevant role of Russia in the emerging
Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In short, throughout the
1990s NATO has been instrumental in managing Europe's secur-
ity evolution-a testament both to the vitality of the transatlantic
link as well as to its ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
If there was a flaw in this emerging cooperative security
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framework, then it was the fact that parts of the Balkans re-
mained outside the framework. The Balkan question, having
never been fully resolved over the course of this century, re-
turned with a vengeance when the violent collapse of Yugoslavia
led to a series of wars.
These wars constituted the greatest challenge to European
security since World War II. Apart from causing countless hu-
manitarian tragedies, they constantly threatened to escalate be-
yond their point of origin, destabilizing wider regions. The
causes of these wars were manifold. While no one denied the
existence of economic crises and ethnic and religious fault lines,
the systematic exploitation of these differences-and their con-
version into violent nationalism-was the result of a deliberate
policy, with Serb President Slobodan Milosevic quickly emerging
as the chief manipulator.
The road to the 1995 Dayton Agreement need not be re-
counted here. Suffice it to say that when the international com-
munity finally became engaged in Bosnia and pushed the coun-
try towards a sustainable peace, it did more than simply demon-
strate that outside intervention can make a difference. The
NATO-led International Implementation Force ("IFOR") united
more than thirty nations, including Russia, in a unique coalition
for peace that became the symbol of a new cooperative approach
to security.
IFOR became the NATO-led Serbian Implementation Force
("SFOR") after one year, but NATO's approach to building se-
curity in Bosnia has not changed. We know fully well that there
can be no peace without justice. We have therefore cooperated
extensively with the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia2 ("ICTY"). At first many believed that this tribu-
nal would be ineffective and that Realpolitik would soon replace
Moralpolitik, as so often in the past. The ICTY proved them
wrong. With NATO's assistance this tribunal has shown it has
real teeth. Over half of the seventy publicly indicted war
criminals in Bosnia have been placed in its custody in The
Hague. Nineteen were physically detained and transferred to
The Hague by NATO troops, sometimes at some considerable
physical risk. Lately, those detained have been more and more
2. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
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senior, disproving the notion that only the "small fry" would face
justice. Although I regret as much as anyone that Karadzic and
Mladic are still at large, I am confident that they too will be
brought to trial in the not too distant future.
As they see more and more other indicted war criminals
taken to The Hague, they have become more isolated. As long
as indicted war criminals run free, their presence can only
poison the atmosphere in Bosnia and hold up the necessary pro-
cess of reconciliation. The past must be acknowledged frankly
and freed of dangerous myths if it is to be overcome. Therefore,
the success of the ICTY is in our common interest, not only for
long term peace in Bosnia but also as a deterrent to all dictators
who may be tempted to mistreat their citizens in the future,
wherever they may be. The process ofjustice may not be perfect,
but war criminals can no longer act with impunity as the interna-
tional community moves to establish a permanent international
criminal court.
While developments in Bosnia took a turn for the better af-
ter 1995, developments in Kosovo took a turn for the worse.
Ever since Milosevic eliminated the autonomy of this province in
the late 1980s, the potential for unrest among its large Albanian
majority had been growing. Predictably, the increasing unrest
strengthened those who advocated violence to achieve indepen-
dence. During the course of 1998, fighting between the Kosovar
Albanians and Serb forces increased, with the latter adopting a
strategy that increasingly resembled the kind of ethnic cleansing
that had occurred in Bosnia.
As a result, neighboring nations, in particular Albania and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia3 ("FYROM"), were
faced with the specter of instability caused by large numbers of
refugees. Equally worrisome was the crisis' implications for the
Bosnian peace process: to allow Belgrade's campaign of ethnic
cleansing to continue unabated would have put the entire pro-
ject of a multi-ethnic Bosnia at risk.
NATO had been taking measures to support the stability of
those neighbors, to avoid a spillover conflict. Both Albania and
FYROM made use of the consultation opportunities provided by
the Partnership for Peace. NATO held exercises in both coun-
tries and advised them on how to control their borders and cope
3. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
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with the influx of refugees. The Alliance also began to draw up
a number of contingency plans for the eventual support of an
international force.
Yet the situation inside Kosovo deteriorated further. In Fall
1998, 300,000 Kosovar civilians fled their homes. Fifty thousand
of them fled to surrounding forests and mountains. With the
approach of winter, many refugees were likely to die from cold
or starvation. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 of 23 Sep-
tember ("Resolution 1199") spoke of "an impending humanita-
rian catastrophe" and characterized the developments as "a
threat to peace and security of the region." Since the Security
Council could not agree on a military response, the chances for
inducing a change from outside remained slim.
Thus, we were faced with the prospect of witnessing a delib-
erately engineered humanitarian disaster in a region bordering
on NATO and European Union territories. If we wanted to avert
this unfolding tragedy, and stabilize that volatile part of Europe
before the end of the twentieth century, then we had to face up
to the Kosovo crisis in full.
For a while it seemed that a set of bold initiatives by the
international community would be able to avert this tragedy
without military intervention. With the endorsement of the
Contact Group, U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke negoti-
ated the sending of unarmed OSCE-observers into Kosovo to ver-
ify Belgrade's compliance with Resolution 1199. NATO would
provide the OSCE observers with air surveillance, while the so-
called NATO Extraction Force deployed in FYROM would help
evacuate the observers in case things should go wrong. NATO
had also supported Holbrooke's mission by putting military pres-
sure on Belgrade: On October 12, 1998, the North Atlantic
Council had agreed to the so-called Activation Order ("AC-
TORD") for air operations against Serbian military assets.
Within weeks it became clear that Milosevic did not keep to
the agreement. Instead, he intensified his campaign using a
strategy of piecemeal military assaults, thus hoping to remain be-
low the threshold of triggering outside intervention.
When the international community brought the parties to-
gether at Rambouillet, France, in February 1999, it was clear to
everyone concerned that this would be the last opportunity for a
comprehensive settlement. Addressing the North Atlantic Coun-
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cil on January 28, 1999, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said
as much, referring to "the need to use force, when all other
means have failed" and warning that "we may be reaching that
limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia."
The proposals put forward at Rambouillet by the Contact
Group-and endorsed by the Security Council and NATO-
were a genuine attempt to create a compromise that would not
only be fair, but also politically viable: Kosovo would remain
part of Serbia, yet with wide-ranging autonomy status. Most Serb
forces would withdraw and the KLA would be disarmed. A
NATO-led force would be deployed to implement the agree-
ment.
Given the urgency of a solution, and the intransigence of
the parties, tight deadlines had to be set. And, given Belgrade's
poor track record for keeping agreements, NATO threatened air
strikes if Milosevic would not sign the compromise.
After difficult negotiations, the Kosovar Albanians signed
the agreement on March 18, 1999. Milosevic, however, rejected
it. Indeed, while negotiations were taking place, the substantial
build-up of Serbian forces in and around Kosovo indicated that
Belgrade was preparing a large-scale offensive against the KLA.
Quite obviously, Milosevic had never intended to accept a polit-
ical solution. On March 24, 1999, NATO began its operation
"Allied Force."
As the above makes clear, "Allied Force" did not come out
of the blue. It only came about after all diplomatic means had
been exhausted. Still, it was a decision the Allies did not take
lightly. Everyone involved knew about the risks: for the first
time in NATO history there would be a sustained military action
outside NATO territory, against a sovereign state; there would be
accidental civilian casualties, and we would risk casualties of our
own. The operation would inevitably burden our relationship
with Russia. And last but not least, we would end up with a long
and expensive commitment to the future of Kosovo.
We decided that these risks were worth taking. For not to
act would have meant that the Atlantic community legitimized
ethnic cleansing in its immediate neighborhood. Having re-
mained passive in the face of a conflict that, as British Prime
Minister Tony Blair put it, seemed like "a throwback to the worst
memories of the 20th century" and would have undermined the
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whole value-system on which our policies are built. Inaction in
the face of the plight of the Kosovars would have cast doubt on
the sincerity of our policies, on the credibility of our institutions,
and of the transatlantic relationship. Bosnia had taught us as
much: indifference can become more costly than engagement.
As President William Clinton put it in his Address to the Nation
on March 24, 1999: "If we and our allies were to allow this war to
continue with no response, President Milosevic would read our
hesitation as a license to kill." Thus, in deciding to go ahead
with "Allied Force," the commonly made distinction between de-
fending values and interests was never really an issue: In Kosovo,
defending our values had become a strategic interest.
The Kosovo campaign clearly was not a "war" in any tradi-
tional sense. Rather, NATO action was a last resort to compel
Belgrade to end a humanitarian disaster it had created, and to
accept the demands set by the international community: an im-
mediate ending of violence and repression; the withdrawal from
Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces; the sta-
tioning in Kosovo of an international military presence; the re-
turn of all refugees; and the establishment of a political frame-
work agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Ac-
cords.
Contrary to widespread criticism, the air campaign achieved
its goals. Having seriously underestimated Allied resolve, Presi-
dent Milosevic accepted the demands of the international com-
munity on June 3, 1999. After seventy-eight days, without any
casualties of its own, NATO had prevailed. A humanitarian dis-
aster had been averted. About one million refugees subse-
quently returned safety and in record time. The ethnic cleans-
ing of the Kosovar Albanians had been reversed even if the
NATO forces in Kosovo faced a new challenge of protecting the
Serb and other minorities remaining in Kosovo.
The military-technological prowess NATO demonstrated in
"Allied Force" was noteworthy in and of itself. Never in history
has a campaign been so painstakingly designed with the impera-
tive to avoid civilian casualties. Out of 23,600 bombs and mis-
siles delivered by Allied aircrafts, only twenty failed to hit their
targets, a level of accuracy never achieved in any previous air
campaign. Of course, I accept that the twenty failures produced
some tragic results and reminded us that even the most carefully
conducted conflicts can never be accident free. Nevertheless,
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NATO went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that ending the
suffering of the Kosovar Albanians did not produce more suffer-
ing than necessary. But perhaps, the most significant achieve-
ment lies elsewhere: the Allies held together. Nineteen democ-
racies, including NATO's three new members, stood firm, know-
ing that this was more than a question of preserving NATO
credibility: it was a question of whether our vision of a demo-
cratic and humane Europe could prevail over a policy of intoler-
ance and xenophobia.
This unique Allied cohesion has also been crucial for estab-
lishing consensus on the legal basis and legitimacy of NATO's
actions. In October 1998, the ACTORD had already raised the
difficult issue of whether NATO could threaten the use of force
without an explicit U.N. Security Council mandate to do so. Al-
lies agreed that NATO could-for it had become abundantly
clear that such a step was the only action that could prevent a
humanitarian disaster.
It was equally clear, though, that such a step would consti-
tute the exception from the rule, not an attempt to create new
international law. An Alliance with nineteen democratic mem-
ber states, each of them a member of the United Nations, three
of them permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, has a
vital interest in a predictable international order. The specific
circumstances of the Kosovo crisis, however, defied all tradi-
tional categories. One particular challenge was to overcome the
paralysis of the U.N. Security Council, which was unable to estab-
lish a common position on the Kosovo crisis and therefore to
take the necessary action.
Indeed, no one put it better than the Secretary General of
the United Nations Kofi Annan. In a speech in Geneva on April
7, 1999, he recalled the meaning of the U.N. Charter, noting
that "the rights and ideals the United Nations exists to protect
are those of peoples .... No government has the right to hide
behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights
or fundamental freedom of its peoples." Even if NATO, as men-
tioned earlier, had no specific Security Council resolution to au-
thorize the use of force, I think it significant that when one
country tried to introduce a motion in the Security Council to
condemn NATO, only three of the fifteen Security Council
members supported it, and therefore it was not put on the
agenda.
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The cohesion and solidarity of the Allies was one key factor,
and the support lent to NATO actions by its partner states was
another. Indeed, NATO's fiftieth anniversary Summit in Wash-
ington on April 24-25, 1999, became a resounding demonstra-
tion of this solidarity. All partner countries present, including
those neighboring Serbia, supported the actions of the Alliance.
The indictment of President Milosevic and four other mem-
bers of the Serbian government by the International Tribunal on
War Crimes in The Hague .was yet another confirmation that
NATO actions were not the preoccupation of a few, but did in-
deed represent a wider international cause. Currently, NATO
troops are cooperating actively with the International Criminal
Tribunal. They are guarding dozens of war crimes sites in Ko-
sovo to prevent any tampering with evidence. Last October,
French troops serving with the NATO-led Kosovo Implementa-
tion Force (or "KFOR") arrested four Serb war crimes suspects
following a long and painstaking investigation into a massacre
committed in Djakovica last April. NATO will do all it can to
help ensure that those guilty of war crimes are brought to jus-
tice. NATO governments and those of its partner countries are
also ready to arrest any indicted war criminal who enters their
territories. I would hope that once Serbia becomes a true de-
mocracy the indicted war criminals concealing themselves there
will also soon discover that they have no hiding place.
Allied cohesion and determination also helped to draw Rus-
sia back into a common solution. When Russia, in the frame-
work of the G-8, essentially reaffirmed the demands of the inter-
national community and supported by NATO, Milosevic had no
potential allies left. On June 3 1999, he accepted the terms. On
June 10, the former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana,
suspended "Allied Force." That same day, Security Council Res-
olution 1244 set the stage for the NATO-led Kosovo Implementa-
tion Force, designed to create the secure environment for other
organizations to begin their work. Heeding the lessons of Bos-
nia: diplomacy and military pressure must come together, or as
Frederic of Prussia once remarked, we may be trying "to play
music without instruments."
And yet another lesson of Bosnia will be heeded: the need
to look beyond the immediate aftermath of the conflict and to
engage in a comprehensive rebuilding of the region. One of the
centerpieces of NATO's Washington Summit was its Southeast-
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ern Initiative, which is now supporting the Stability Pact drawn
up by the European Union. Together, these initiatives signaled
a comprehensive commitment to establishing a viable political
and economic order-not just in Kosovo, but across Southeast-
ern Europe.
It is evident that in Kosovo proper, the challenge is perhaps
even more difficult than in Bosnia. For one thing, there is no
Dayton Peace Agreement to which all the parties have agreed
and which provides a clear road map for the future of the prov-
ince. Given the persisting hatred between the parties, no one
harbors any illusions that reconciliation could be achieved
within a few years. But the people deserve a chance, and they
will reconcile even less if NATO and the international commu-
nity are not there to help them. Despite well-publicized
problems, many Kosovar leaders realize that a democratic multi-
ethnic society is the only viable solution in the long term. In-
deed, the rapid return of refugees much faster than anyone ex-
pected, including some from Serbia, has been the most surpris-
ing, positive development since the deployment of KFOR.
Thanks to KFOR's widespread presence and even-handed
approach, the level of violence has subsided. By detaining per-
petrators of violence and confiscating unauthorized weapons,
KFOR has demonstrated that it is determined to provide for the
security for all inhabitants of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic
background.
One of the biggest challenges has been the demilitarization
process of the Kosovo Liberation Army ("UCK"), which was su-
pervised by KFOR. Following consistent Allied pressure, the
UCK complied with the terms of the June 21 Undertaking on
Demilitarization and handed in all required weapons. Mean-
while, the U.N. Mission to Kosovo ("UNMIK"), in close coordi-
nation with KFOR, is establishing a multi-ethnic civilian emer-
gency corps closely modeled on the French S&urit Civile. The
Kosovo Protection Corps ("Corps") will be prepared to respond
to any natural or accidental disaster; undertake search and res-
cue missions; provide humanitarian assistance; assist with de-
mining; and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and commu-
nities. Overall political authority of the Corps will rest with the
United Nations, but KFOR will assume an active monitoring and
supervisory role. Many former UCK fighters have already come
forward to join the new Kosovo Police Force as part of their over-
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all integration into civilian life. Other former UCK fighters are
volunteering to join the new Kosovo Police Force.
Indeed, cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK goes far
beyond the UCK's transformation and integration, reinforcing a
central lesson of Bosnia about the need for close civil-military
cooperation. Looking ahead, KFOR will continue to carry out a
number of supporting tasks until the international civil presence
is able to take over fully. The tasks are numerous: from creating
a new Kosovo police force' to establishing effective border con-
trols and new democratic political structures.
Naturally, all of the above will take much time and effort.
Also, there is still no agreement on the long-term political future
of Kosovo. In the meantime, however, the international commu-
nity is doing its best to assure the future of a multi-ethnic society.
But let there be no doubt: the ultimate responsibility rests with
the local population-ethnic Albanians and Serbs alike. They
must put aside their mentality of hatred and do their part to
achieve a lasting peace. The international community can assist,
but will not allow a culture of dependency to develop. Demo-
cratic values cannot be imposed from the outside, but can only
be derived from the willingness of political leaders to take full
responsibility for the future security and prosperity of their com-
munities.
KFOR will have to stay for as long as it takes to get the job
done. As with SFOR in Bosnia, which will soon enter its fifth
year, NATO troops cannot leave while there is still even a small
risk of a relapse into armed conflict. Peace must be self-sus-
taining. Such a long-term military presence will have its costs.
Yet these costs pale in comparison to the Cold War spending
levels. Security in Europe still comes with a price tag, but it re-
mains affordable. And, as we have learned again and again, the
price of indifference can be far higher than that of engagement.
The Kosovo crisis proved both a vindication and a challenge
for NATO. It was a vindication because it reaffirmed the logic of
NATO's post-Cold War reform, emphasizing the need to have
partners, the need for strong relations with Russia, the need to
maintain NATO's military competence, and the need for a trans-
atlantic approach to European security.
The Kosovo crisis also provided a resounding affirmation of
our new approach to security, based on the primacy of human
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values-values not only endorsed by the nineteen Allies, but also
by NATO's partners. Never before has the notion of interdepen-
dence of security become so dramatically visible. And never
before in NATO's fifty year history has the notion of the Alliance
as a community of values been expressed more clearly.
Yet Kosovo was also a challenge. Not only did it confront
NATO with a unique combination of political, military, legal,
and moral issues that were without precedent, but it also
presented Europe with a strong reminder of its military short-
comings. Future military operations will place a premium on
both European and North American Allies having the capabili-
ties and technologies to allow them to act together in an effec-
tive and cohesive way. If human rights are to be upheld through
military action, then the NATO Allies will need high-tech mili-
tary capabilities to ensure that they can perform these missions
as quickly and as effectively as possible, and at the smallest
human cost for all concerned.
I admit that as we enter the millennium, we would have
liked to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of this Alliance last year
in different circumstances. We all would have preferred to high-
light Europe's achievements rather than concern ourselves with
a region in which this continent shows its darkest side. But in
having decided to become engaged, to make peace and long-
term stability in the Balkans our concern, we have sent a strong
signal that in our Atlantic community values have meaning. This
is the central message of the new NATO-a message that will
reinforce the many initiatives that the Alliance will undoubtedly
undertake in years to come to better protect the human rights of
its citizens and secure the entire Euro-Atlantic area.
1999]
